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Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall (MMr. Marshall"), was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pretrial 
motion to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized from the 
rental car he was driving when he was arrested. The trial court 
denied Mr. Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory 
appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband 
in detail as the legal issues presented are fact sensitive. 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery ("Trooper AveryM) was driving 
*This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing replaces the 
opinion of the same name issued on December 26, 1989. 
on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a motor home. Trooper 
Avery observed that Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking 
for approximately two miles after he passed the motor home. Not 
knowing whether Mr. Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or 
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the signal on, Trooper 
Avery pulled the vehicle over to inform Mr. Marshall of the 
problem and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper Avery had 
issued similar warning citations for turn signal violations 
approximately five to ten times in the previous six-month period. 
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall/ Trooper Avery noticed the 
vehicle had California license plates. He approached Mr. 
Marshall's vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn signal 
problem. Mr. Marshall responded that he had been having Ma hard 
time keeping the thing turned off." 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his driver's license and 
vehicle registration. Mr. Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle. Mr. 
Marshall said he was going skiing in Denver and planned to return 
the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental agreement 
indicated that the car would be returned in New York in five days. 
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became suspicious that Mr. 
Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car where he issued a 
warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other." Trooper Avery 
then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental 
agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying 
alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not. 
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could "look inside 
the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go ahead," Trooper Avery 
and Mr. Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The 
passenger door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached in on the 
driver's side to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a small 
red bag on the floor of the vehicle and asked if he could open 
it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No contraband was found inside the bag 
or the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the 
trunk and if Mr. Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall 
attempted to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly that 
Trooper Avery had to assist him by holding the key latch cover up 
while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw four 
padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. Trooper 
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Avery asked Mr. Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. 
Marshall responded ••clothes." Trooper Avery then asked if he 
could look in the suitcases. Mr. Marshall immediately reversed 
his statement and responded that the suitcases were not his and 
must have already been in the trunk when he rented the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery testified there was some play in the zipper of one 
bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy 
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any evidence to 
contradict Trooper Avery's testimony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
M[W]e will not disturb the trial court's factual evaluation 
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Further, H[t]he trial court's finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence 
or if [the appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) requires the trial 
court to state its findings on the record "[w]here factual issues 
are involved in determining a motion." Those findings must be 
sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the opportunity to 
adequately review the decision below.1 
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently required detailed 
findings of fact to support a judgment entered by a trial judge 
in civil cases. Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979) ("The importance of complete, accurate and consistent 
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the 
resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law. To that end 
the findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached."); Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (findings of 
fact must indicate the "mind of the court." (quoting Parks v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983)). 
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease the burden of 
an appellate court in its review of a trial court's decision on a 
motion to suppress. This is particularly true where multiple 
issue are presented in the motion to suppress. 4 W. LaFave, 
PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper Avery used the fact 
that his turn signal was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his 
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking. 
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an 
officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its 
occupants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on 
two alternative grounds. First, the stop "could be based on 
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime." Jjl. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State 
v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Second, the police 
officer can "stop an automobile for a traffic violation committed 
in the officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. However, 
an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to 
search for evidence of a more serious crime. Id. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. Marshall's vehicle 
to investigate his hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved 
in drug trafficking, we determine whether a hypothetical 
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting him or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to issue 
a warning for failing to terminate a turn signal. III. at 978. 
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop of his vehicle is 
similar to the stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. We 
disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that 
the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a 
car. In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment problem 
with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was 
(Footnote 1 continued) 
Search & Seizure § 11.2, at 252 (1987) [hereinafter wLaFaveM] 
(citing State v. Johnson, 16 Or. App. 560, 519 P,2d 1053, 1058-59 
(1974)). Many jurisdictions require specific findings of fact on 
all motions to suppress. See LaFave at § 11.2 n.188. We believe 
the requirement a sound one. 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to turn it off.2 
Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop a 
vehicle when he or she believes the vehicle's safety equipment is 
not functioning properly,3 
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra, Trooper Avery was 
not suspicious of Mr, Marshall for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find some reason to pull him 
over, and, before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed 
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle. 
2. While the warning citation does not specify which provision 
of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, the state asserts that 
his conduct was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1) 
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides:! 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for the owner to cause or 
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on 
any highway any vehicle or combination of 
vehicles which is in such unsafe condition 
as to endanger any person, or which does 
not contain those parts or is not at all 
times equipped with lamps and other 
equipment in proper condition gnfl 
adjustment . . . . 
3. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979), the 
United States Supreme Court stated that an officer has a duty in 
the interest of highway safety to stop vehicles for safety 
reasons. "Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements 
are observable, and something can be done about them by the 
observing officer, directly and immediately.- l£i. at 660. The 
Court inferred that as long as an officer suspects the driver is 
violating "any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and 
equipment regulations,- the police officer may legally stop the 
vehicle. Id. at 661. See Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1355 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court held stop justified when vehicle's 
headlight was out, a tail light was broken, the license plate and 
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. Puia, 112 Ariz. 
519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn 
signals justified stop); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 
1989) (stop justified when blinking headlights led officer to 
stop vehicle for safety reasons). 
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was not a pretext, but was a valid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's vehicle was functioning 
properly. 
UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
Next, Mr. Marshall complains that the extent of his detention 
and the scope of Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded 
constitutional limits.4 
"[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were 
•unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
19-20 (1968). 
We have previously found that Trooper Avery's traffic stop of 
Mr. Marshall was justified. The remaining question is whether 
Trooper Avery's subsequent detention and questioning of Mr. 
Marshall was reasonably related to the initial traffic stop or 
was justified because Trooper Avery had a reasonable suspicion to 
believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a more serious crime. United 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). 
The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a 
bright-line rule as to the acceptable length of a detention 
because "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern 
over rigid criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 
(1985). The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the 
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant." id. at 686. 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten 
minutes of stopping Mr. Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's 
driver's license and the vehicle rental agreement. Trooper Avery 
claims that as a result of his examination of Mr. Marshall's 
4. We do not analyze this issue under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution as the state constitutional issue was not 
sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis 
provided on appeal as to why our analysis should be different 
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 
327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
driver's license and the vehicle rental agreement and his brief 
conversation with Mr. Marshall, he became suspicious that Mr. 
Marshall was involved in drug trafficking. Specifically, Trooper 
Avery points to the fact that Mr. Marshall produced a New York 
driver's license and a California rental agreement for the 
vehicle. When questioned about the rental agreement, Mr. 
Marshall said he was going skiing in Colorado and planned to 
return the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental 
agreement indicated the car was to be returned to New York in 
five days, the approximate time it takes to drive directly from 
California to New York. In addition, Mr. Marshall was driving 
along a well-known drug trafficking route. 
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper Avery then asked Mr. 
Marshall if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the 
vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper Avery 
allegedly asked for permission to look into the vehicle and 
received Mr. Marshall's consent. 
The trial judge found that Trooper Avery's "investigation was 
reasonable in view of the defendant's statements in regards to 
the vehicle ownership and the driver's usage. The destination 
itinerary would have put a reasonable officer on notice that 
something was wrong." Although not directly so stating, the 
judge, in substance, concluded that Trooper Avery had reasonable 
suspicion to believe that Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal 
conduct. Although it is a close call, we agree with the trial 
court's assessment of the reasonableness of the detention. 
We find that Trooper Avery's questioning of Mr. Marshall as 
to conduct unrelated to the traffic stop was justified because he 
had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a 
more serious crime. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519. 
In conclusion, based on the totality of the circumstances, we 
agree with the trial court that Trooper Avery's ten-minute 
detention and brief questioning of Mr. Marshall prior to Mr. 
Marshall's alleged consent to search the vehicle was not an 
unreasonable detention. 
SEARCH 
On appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his initial stop 
and subsequent detention were not constitutionally deficient, the 
subsequent search of the trunk of the vehicle and the suitcases 
found in the trunk without a warrant violated his fourth 
amendment rights. The state contends, on the other hand, that 
Mr. Marshall consented to the search of the trunk and abandoned 
any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's 
search of the suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5 In 
our prior opinion, we focused solely on whether the search of the 
suitcases was proper. We found the warrantless search of the 
suitcases unconstitutional as we refused to allow the state to 
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal. We granted the state's petition for rehearing to 
re-examine the related fourth amendment issues of voluntary 
consent and abandonment which are central to a resolution of this 
appeal. 
1. Stenfling 
The state, in its original brief on appeal, claimed Mr. 
Marshall was without standing to challenge the seizure of the 
suitcases as he had disclaimed any ownership or possessory 
interest in the suitcases during the search and thus had no 
expectation of privacy in their contents. See Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 138-50 (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 
(Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); State v. DeAlo, 748 P„2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The state relies upon the following testimony from the 
preliminary hearing: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] And what was inside the trunk? 
A. [Trooper Avery] There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what 
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly, 
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have 
been in there when he rented the car. 
5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had probable 
cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore, 
need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable 
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile 
exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk of a 
car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if 
probable cause exists, police can search closed containers found 
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) 
(warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi 
invalid); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the trunk of a 
vehicle invalid); State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 272 n.l (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the 
Ross holding). 
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In our prior opinion, we relied on the Utah Supreme Court 
decision of State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), which 
squarely held that standing to challenge the validity of a search 
under the fourth amendment "is not a jurisdictional doctrine 
[but] is a substantive doctrine that identifies those who may 
assert rights against unlawful searches and seizures." !<£. at 
1138. Citing the general rule that a substantive issue or -claim 
of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal," the 
supreme court deemed the issue of standing waived. Id,, at 
1138-39. 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in 
that case the state not only failed to raise the issue of 
standing in the motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal 
and that here, unlike Schlosser, the state raises standing simply 
as an alternative ground to uphold the trial court's denial of 
the motion to suppress.6 We do not find the distinction 
determinative.7 
6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court had, in several 
cases, considered standing for the first time on appeal and had 
utilized the doctrine to refuse to consider the constitutional 
validity of a challenged search. See, e.g., State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (court 
did not address whether the issue of standing had been raised 
below, but stated that defendant could not assert any expectation 
of privacy in vehicle because he did not own vehicle and had 
presented no testimony that he had permission of owner or had 
borrowed vehicle "under circumstances that would imply permissive 
use"); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State 
below argued there was consent by defendant's ex-wife to search 
his mother's trailer. On appeal, the state argued defendant had 
no possessory or proprietary interest in the trailer and thus had 
no expectation of privacy. The court declined to reach the issue 
of consent because it found that defendant lacked standing to 
object to the search because the stipulated evidence did not show 
that defendant shared ownership, use or possession of the 
trailer.); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) (At 
trial, the defendant produced evidence that neither the attache 
case in which the evidence was found nor the vehicle belonged to 
the defendant. The court did not address whether the issue of 
standing was raised below, but declined to reach the guestion of 
the validity of the search because the defendant conceded he did 
not own the case or the vehicle and had failed to show any 
expectation of privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is 
sometimes unclear whether the Utah Supreme Court raised the issue 
of standing sua sponte on appeal or permitted the state to raise 
the issue of standing for the first time on appeal. We assume 
that Schlosser supercedes these earlier cases and thus do not 
follow them. 
7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow standing to 
be utilized to attack the trial court's granting of a motion to 
The United States Supreme Court took the same position in 
Steaaald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), when it refused 
to allow the government to raise the issue of fourth amendment 
standing for the first time on appeal to provide an alternative 
ground to sustain the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to 
suppress. The Court concluded: 
Aside from arguing that a search warrant 
was not constitutionally required/ the 
Government was initially entitled to 
defend against petitioner's charge of an 
unlawful search by asserting that 
petitioner lacked a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the searched home# or that 
he consented to the search, or that 
exigent circumstances justified the 
entry. The Government, however, mav lose 
its right to raise factual issues of this 
sort before this Court when it has made 
contrary assertions in the courts below, 
when it has acquiesced in contrary 
findings by those courts, or when it has 
failed to raise such questions in a timely 
fashion during the litigation. 
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
The state, on petition for rehearing, contends that language 
in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) is contrary to our 
conclusion that the state should not be allowed to raise standing 
for the first time on appeal. We disagree. The language in 
Rakas relied upon by the state is consistent with our view. 
The proponent of a motion to suppress has 
the burden of establishing that his own 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by 
the challenged search or seizure. The 
(Footnote 7 continued) 
suppress in Schlosser, the court relied on State v. Goodman, 42 
Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), which held the state 
could not raise the issue of standing for the first time on 
appeal to provide an alternative ground for sustaining the 
trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. Id., at 1060. 
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prosecutor argued that petitioners lacked 
standing to challenge the search because 
they did not own the rifle, the shells or 
the automobile* Petitioners did not 
contest the factual predicates of the 
prosecutor's argument and instead, simply 
stated that thev were not reguired to 
prove ownership to object to the search. 
The prosecutor's argument gave petitioners 
notice that they were to be put to their 
proof on any issue as to which they had 
the burden, and because of their failure 
to assert ownership, we must assume, for 
purposes of our review, that petitioners 
do not own the rifle or the shells. 
Id, at 130 n.l (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
We agree with the state and Rakas that Mr. Marshall has 
the ultimate burden of proof to establish that his fourth 
amendment rights were violated or, to put it otherwise, that 
he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched or the 
articles seized.8 Nevertheless, warrantless searches are 
per se unreasonable and the burden is on the state, in the 
first instance, to show that a warrantless search is lawful. 
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). 
We believe Rakas is consistent with our view that the 
prosecutor, as part of the state's burden to establish the 
constitutionality of a warrantless search, must give a 
defendant "notice that he will be put to his proof on the 
issue of fourth amendment standing. This can be done at any 
time during the hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress as 
long as the defendant has an opportunity to put on evidence to 
8. However, the failure of the state to challenge Mr. 
Marshall's standing at the suppression hearing did not give 
Mr. Marshall an opportunity to assert his expectation of 
privacy. ££e Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227-28 
(1972) (per curiam) (Where petitioner's failure to assert an 
expectation of privacy may have been explained by the 
Government's failure to challenge standing either at the 
suppression hearing or at trial, the United States Supreme 
Court remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
to allow petitioner to establish a privacy interest.). 
meet the claim.9 Once the defendant has been put on notice 
that the state claims the warrantless search was 
constitutional because he has no expectation of privacy in the 
area searched, then the defendant must factually demonstrate 
that he does have standing to contest the warrantless search. 
We believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to 
protect the defendant from being required to deal with new 
legal issues on appeal when he had no warning of the necessity 
to develop the relevant facts below. 
2. Consent/Abandonment 
The state, on petition for rehearing, excuses its failure 
to raise the issue of standing claiming that neither Mr. 
Marshall, the state nor the trial judge focused on the search 
of the suitcases in the motion to suppress hearing. Rather, 
the state claims the hearing centered on the pretextual nature 
of the stop, the unreasonable detention of Mr. Marshall and 
the unlawful search of the trunk. 
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing, claims the 
following comment made by defense counsel sufficiently focused 
the proceeding on the search of the suitcases: "Additionally 
there is no evidence that there was consent to search the 
bags." 
Upon a re-examination of the record, we agree with the 
state that the parties and the trial judge did not focus on 
the critical issue of the search of the suitcases at the 
motion to suppress hearing. The result is that the trial 
judge did not make adequate findings of fact on the issues of 
voluntary consent to search the trunk or the suitcases and Mr. 
Marshall's alleged abandonment of any privacy interest in the 
suitcases, which the parties now agree are pivotal on appeal. 
We therefore remand for a rehearing on these critical issues. 
9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to suppress 
hearing cannot be used against the defendant at trial. See 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (prosecutor 
cannot use a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as 
substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless defendant makes 
no objection). We note, however, that the United States 
Supreme Court had not decided whether the Simmons rule 
precludes the use of a defendant's suppression hearing 
testimony to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94 & n.9 (1980). 
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We nevertheless discuss the controlling law to guide the trial 
court on rehearing. 
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is 
conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218# 219 (1973); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "[T]he 
question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact 
•voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express 
or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
227. HA trial court's finding of voluntary consent will not 
be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous." United States v. 
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 
U.S. 958 (1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), 
the Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the 
government to sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent 
was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; (2) the government 
must prove consent was given without 
duress or coercion, express or implied; 
and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 
(10th Cir. 1962)). See also United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 
1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback, 
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 
980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the 
ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the specific area 
agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . . . Any 
police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent 
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect." 
United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, 
e.g., People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of 
consent exceeded when police asked to "look around" the house, 
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and 
closed containers). 
The trial court made the following conclusory finding on the 
issue of Mr. Marshall's consent: "The Defendant consented to the 
search. There was no evidence of duress or coercion." This 
conclusory finding on consent is not particularly helpful in 
determining whether Mr. Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and 
specific" as it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be 
searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk, 
or the locked suitcases.10 Furthermore, the relevant portions 
from the transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are troubling: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] What were the words he [sic] used 
when you asked him to search his vehicle? 
A. [Trooper Avery] I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were 
any—if there was any—were there any drugs in the 
vehicle, and he took two or three seconds—no, wait a 
minute, I guess—I first asked him if he was carrying 
any weapons and he told me no. I then asked him if he 
was carrying any—if there was any alcohol in the 
vehicle, he said that he did not drink. I recall both 
answers were quite quick. And then I asked him if there 
were any drugs in the vehicle, he paused for, you know, 
probably two or three seconds, and then told me no. I 
then asked him if it would be okay if I looked in the 
vehicle, search the vehicle, and he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, did you ask if you could look in the vehicle, or 
did you ask if you could search the vehicle? 
A. Well, according to this [his report], I said—I asked if 
I could look in the vehicle. 
Q. So, it was "look in the vehicle"? 
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the 
vehicle or anything else, did you? 
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the importance of detailed findings on a motion to suppress. 
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A. No. I just asked if I could look in the vehicle. 
Q. And what happened then? 
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, you know, he said go right 
ahead. He got out/ gathered up his papers and we walked 
up to the front of the vehicle, and he had to open the 
passenger door, as I recall. 
Q. And how did you get in the trunk? 
A. I asked him, I said—asked him if he had the key to the 
trunk and he says yes, and I says—and I asked him if 
he'[d] open it, which he did, he tried. He was 
extremely nervous at the time. Ii— 
Q. So did you open the trunk? 
A. No, sir, I did not. He—he could not—there was a 
little latch over the key hole. He was shaking so hard, 
he couldn't even hold the latch open, so I held the 
latch up for him so he could insert the key. 
Without the assistance of specific findings of fact, we 
cannot resolve the difficult issue of whether Mr. Marshall's 
opening the trunk constituted implied consent to search the trunk 
under the totality of the circumstances presented. See United 
States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 
U.S. 824 (1978) (voluntary consent found where defendant silently 
reached into his pocket, removed key, then unlocked and opened 
camper door). 
Furthermore, the record creates a substantial question as to 
whether the court's general finding that there was "no evidence 
of duress or coercion" was intended to apply to the search of the 
trunk or, even if it was, whether the finding is consistent with 
the standard required for a voluntary consent. See United States 
v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Likewise, the court in 
its findings fails to focus on the search of the locked suitcases 
and the issues of voluntary consent or abandonment. 
Even if we were to accept the state's argument that the 
undisputed facts support a finding that Mr. Marshall 
abandoned11 any expectation of privacy in the suitcases by his 
ambiguous disclaimer of ownership and that the state should be 
allowed to raise this fourth amendment standing issue for the 
first time on appeal, we would be unable to dispose of this case 
on the record before us. The state, in its petition for 
rehearing, correctly points out that "a loss of standing to 
challenge a search cannot be brought about by illegal police 
conduct." United States v. Labat, 696 F. Supp. 1419, 1425 (D. 
Kan. 1988). 
Thus, we would have to determine if the search of the trunk 
was illegal or was a result of a voluntary consent. This we 
cannot do on the record before us. 
Even if we determined the search of the trunk was unlawful, 
the "defendant must show a nexus between the allegedly unlawful 
police conduct and the abandonment of the property." 2&. at 
1426. See, e.g., United States v. Tolbert, 692 F«2d 1041 (6th 
Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (While "an 
unconstitutional seizure or arrest which prompts a disclaimer of 
property vitiates that act," 14. at 1045, the court found the 
defendant's disclaimer was not precipitated by improper conduct. 
Id. at 1048.); United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th 
Cir. 1982) ("There must be a nexus between the allegedly unlawful 
police conduct and abandonment of property if the challenged 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1173 (10th 
Cir. 1983) (Court found abandonment when police initially saw 
defendant running with a brown satchel, however, when they 
captured defendant, he did not have the satchel and disavowed 
knowledge of it. Police later found the satchel outside the 
building and searched it.); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 
199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) 
(court found abandonment where the defendant, after picking up 
the luggage at the claim area, produced a mismatched baggage 
claim check, told agents that his name was not on the luggage 
name tag, and allowed the agents to return the luggage to the 
claim area, thus giving the agents the impression that he had no 
interest in the luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 
1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982) (court 
found abandonment where the defendant disclaimed ownership of a 
wallet found on the seat of the vehicle); United States v. 
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (court found 
abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and 
began to walk away from them). 
evidence is to be suppressed."); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 
726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (if there is a nexus between unlawful 
police conduct and the discovery of evidence, the court should 
suppress the evidence). See generally Search and Seizure: What 
Constitutes Abandonment of Personal Property within Rule that 
Search and Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not 
Unreasonable—Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381 (1985). Again, 
there is no finding on this crucial issue. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand this interlocutory appeal 
for a rehearing on Mr. Marshall's motion to suppress on the 
limited issues of whether Mr. Marshall voluntarily consented to 
the search of the trunk or the suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall 
abandoned any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus lacks 
standing to challenge their search, and finally, if the trial 
court finds there was an illegal search of the trunk or 
suitcases, whether there is a sufficient nexus between that 
illegal search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his 
expectation of privacy in the suitcases. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Nornran H. JacksonX/uudge 
